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Abstrat
During the last enturies of human history, many questions was repeated in onnetion
with the great problems of the existene and origin of human beings, and also of the
Universe. The old questions of ommon sense and philosophy have not been solved
in spite of the indisputable results of modern natural sienes. Reently the so-alled
anthropi priniples show that these questions are still present.
We investigated some important results of the modern osmology and their onse-
quenes with respet to the orresponding questions of philosophy and logi. After a
short oneptual introdution there are two baselines. It is showed rst how Goedel's
theroem aets the foundation of anthropi priniples. Our train of thought shows
that Goedel's inompleteness theorem may deny some eorts laiming that anthropi
priniples an be ruled out. After this in the Appendix we touh the branh of ques-
tions that are onneted with the philosophial aspets of anthropi priniples and the
multiple-world hypothesis. Here we investigated those formulae of quantum theory,
whih are supposed to be the ground for the theory of many worlds-hypothesis.
Although our method is based partly on philosophy and logi, it is mainly grounded
in the results and methods of the natural sienes. So we need both physis and
philosophy to go in our way.
Keywords: anthropi priniples, physis and philosophy, mathematial logi.
1 Introdution
In this paper after a short historial and oneptual introdution (Se. 2) we will
investigate our main thesis in Se. 3.: our paper is onneted in general with
the origin of anthropi priniples whih an be interpreted in a philosophial
manner: whih inentives produed them, when and in what irumstanes will
their eet be questionable, or when does this eet disappear? Our purpose is
to nd an answer to these questions. However the main goal is the next. We will
show that the validity of the anthropi priniples annot be denied making use
of the unied theories (GUT, ToE). To prove our thesis we will also use Goedel's
theorem. In Appendies 1. and 2. we will examine in a omprehensive sense
the physial bakground and in some aspets the philosophial bakground of
the anthropi priniples, and their onsequenes in philosophial elds - and
naturally we will give the orrespondent denitions of them.
1
2 Conepts
2.1 Introdution of the Anthropi Priniples on the basis
of their historial bakground
As siene has grown, the elements of the dominant medieval world-onepts
have disappeared, one after the other, resulting in the following onlusions:
• the Earth is not in the enter of the world, and it has not a signiant
plae in the Universe,
• the heavens are not built of onentri spheres, and the motion of elestial
bodies is not regular (i.e. it an not be desribed by spherial motions),
• the struture of the Universe is developed through physial proesses,
• living beings are a result of an evolution.
1
Up to the present, siene, and several branhes of philosophy of siene, have
tried to eliminate the Creator on the basis of sienti theories. It seemed that
a mehanisti world-onept whih dominated the physis of the 19th entury
ould be a omplete explanation of the Universe. Many sientists have expeted
the end of physial researh.
2
These expetations were rst onfuted by the
unertainty priniple of quantum-mehanis.
3
Afterwards Goedel's theorem of
inompleteness veried that the axiomatization of mathematis was useless, i.e.
the axiomati mathematis annot ompletely explain all the phenomena of the
Universe. Finally, in informatis Turing's theorem restrited the possibilities of
the automata.
This development reahed its ulmination in 1973, when Brandon Carter de-
ned his famous priniple, whih was intended as a methodologial osmologial
priniple. He alled it the anthropi priniple, and he distinguished between two
versions of this priniple: the weak and the strong anthropi priniple (abbre-
viated WAP and SAP). Its weak form is presented by Carter in the following
manner:
All the osmologial theories have to take into aount the fat that
our loation in the Universe is neessarily privileged to the extent of
being ompatible with our existene as observers. (Carter, 1974)
This statement ontains the essential elements. However, we have to give a
fuller denition of the WAP as follows:
1
We do not aept the equivalene of dierent world-onepts or various systems of osmo-
logial explanations, and we think that more modern physial theories ould better approah
the objetive reality of the world.
2
They thought that there were only some unsolved problems whih ould soon be solved.
One of these problems was the blakbody radiaton, from whih the quantum-theory has
emerged. As it is known the quantum-theory has not yet reahed its nal state. Reently
there have been similar opinions in onnetion with the nal theory, (i.e. that the end of
physis is imminent).
3
Aording to the unertainty priniple in physis it is not possible to measure with innite
preision the value of two so-alled onjugate quantities. Thus the unertainty in the measure-
ment of the position of an eletron varies inversely with the unertainty in the measurement
of its momentum.
2
The observed values of all physial and osmologial quantities are
not equally probable, but they take on values restrited by the re-
quirement that sites an be found where arbon based life an evolve,
and by the requirement that the Universe is old enough for it to have
already done so (Barrow-Tipler 1996, p. 16.).
The WAP states that the physial onstants and laws of the Universe must
be suh as we measure them, i.e. these laws and onstants must be ompatible
with our life. The WAP was used in this meaning during its history. For example
in the 60's when Hoyle, Bondi and Gold developed the steady-state osmologial
model stating the ontinuous reation of matter and giving an alternative to the
standard osmologial model. Before it was disproved by observational data in
its original form, the use of WAP had shown the improbability of the steady-
state osmologial theory.
4
Brandon Carter stated also the strong anthropi
priniple (SAP). We will use the denition of the SAP as follows:
The Universe must have those properties whih allow life to develop
within it at some stage in its history.
5
(Barrow-Tipler 1996, p. 21.)
We note that this is more speulative than WAP. In the SAP Carter argued
the explanation of why the values of dimensionless physial onstants are what
they are. The immediate onsequene of SAP is that the physial laws and
onstants must be suh as to allow the emergene of life. For further denitions
see the Appendies and Balázs, (2005), Hetesi-Végh (2006) .
2.2 Unied theories in physis
When physis suessfully onstruted a omplete theory, sientists immediately
started to investigate if a new theory was suitable for the line of already existing
models and proesses or if a ontradition emerged. If a new theory passes
the test, it must be the result of valid physial thinking. In former times the
situation was that in some areas of phenomena the theories whih explained
them, brought to a higher level, ould also serve as a universal model (unied
theory) explaining all phenomena.
An obvious example was the uniation of eletriity and magnetism done by
Maxwell. As it is known, Maxwell's four equations desribe all eletromagneti
proesses, and if onditions are satisfatory they split into two pairs of equations:
eletrostati and magneti equations.
Up to the present physis has found four fundamental fores: gravitational
fore, eletromagneti fore, weak and strong interations. The main purpose
of reent investigations is to unify these fores in a grand uniation. The
uniation of eletro-magneti and weak fores was a suess (with eletroweak
4
As it was shown by M. Rees (1974), in the standard osmology the timesale of stellar
evolution is in the order of Hubble time. There is quite little hane in a steady-state osmology
to be the same.
5
Interesting to note that aording to a more ne division there is an ordering and an al-
lowing strong anthropi priniple (SAP1 and SAP2). If the rst is true, the life is neessarily
emerging in a ne-tuned universe, but in the allowing one only the possibility emerges. In
logial view the true SAP is the SAP1, and SAP2 is loser to the WAP. Aording to Carter's
original statement the strong version is the following: The Universe (and hene the funda-
mental parameters on whih it depends) must be suh as to admit the reation of intelligent
observers within it at some stage of its evolution. (Carter 1974, p. 294.)
3
fore as a result), and later sueeded to inorporate the strong interation, but
it had not yet ontained the gravitational fore. The theory whih unies the
three mentioned fores is alled Grand Unied Theory (GUT).
After the suess of GUT a group of theoretial physiists thought that it
would be possible to onstrut suh a theory whih will be able to desribe all
physial phenomena and whih shall ontain all the former theories. It is alled
world-formula or Theory of Everything (ToE).
3 Possible onsequenes of a world-formula.
Goedel's theorem
As we have mentioned in Part 2, some physiists, among those who are working
on the grand uniation, hope that the world-formula an be found. It will be
able to explain everything, it will also serve as explanation of the existene of
the Universe, and it will show that the world is neessarily this and annot be
other. The latter statement is true beause a nal world-formula is dedutive
(one say), every other thing is only a orollary of it. After suh expetations
some sientists delared that unied theories will put an end to the questions
whih lead us from the fat of the ne-tuned Universe to the anthropi priniples
(Kane et al. 2002). If these expetations ould be fullled, then it would be
a omplete world-explanation, and it would signify the end of the anthropi
priniples, beause a ToE puts an end to the fat of the ne-tuned physial
onstants and laws.
However, these hopes are exessive for two reasons:
• Goedel's theorem denies that an arithmetial system whih is at least as
large as the system of Prinipia Mathemtia is omplete in itself.
• There is no physial theory whih an explain why the world exists just
so. Goedel (1931) proved his undeideness or inompleteness theory whih
(with some simpliation) states the following two theorems:
First theorem: If an axiomati theory of sets is ontradition-free,
then there are sentenes whih are neither provable nor unprovable.
Seond theorem: In any onsistent axiomatizable theory the onsis-
tene of the system is not provable in the system.
6
From these two theorems we an draw the following important onlusions.
There is no mathematial theorem whih arries its own trueness in itself while
the set of axioms, whih are the base of this theorem, is unertain with regard
to its self-onsistene. But theoretial physis uses mathematis to desribe the
world. From this follow the fats mentioned below. Beause of Goedels theorem,
a reliable nal world-formula annot be onstruted. If it were realizable then it
would be true, but not yet neessarily as it was observed by Jaki (1987), (1998,
pp. 89-117). (Note that Hawking, a former adherent of a ToE, also disovered
Goedel's theory and its relevane in physis. (Hawking, 2000) (Hawking, 2003)).
However Jaki's train of thought needs some explanation. Let us start with our
key statement. If an axionmatized mathematial theory whih is equivalent to
6
See Myers (2000) for details.
4
ToE is ontradition-free then it is not omplete, and if it is omplete then it
annot be ontradition-free.
Also if ToE an be made then it must be axiomatizable beause otherwise it
is not assured that it would inlude all physial laws. As Tipler states (Tipler
1990, p.323.) any sienti theory  whih is a logial system indeed  is based
on axioms. Axioms an be modied, also the andvane is always possible for the
present axioms always may be found to be onsequenes of more fondamental
axioms. If this is the ase theories may more and more onvergent.
It seems in the history of physis that the more fores and phenomena is
inluded the less freedom remains to onstrut the new unied theory. If we
suppose that this advane reahes its end i.e. ToE is onstruted, it is no doubt,
that ToE is also axiomati. Tipler notes that Goedel's theorem ats on ToE
i ToE is at least diult as the system of Prinipia Mathetia. Aording to
him it is "quite possible that a ToE ould lie in one of the deidable branhes
of mathematis." (Tipler, 1990, p. 325.)
7
We think that Tipler's argument is inorret. If a ToE is ToE it ontains
all the mathematis hene it will be at least as diult as the number theory
(i.e. the Prinipia Mathematia). Furthermore the physial world inludes at
least natural numbers, and it is desribed by a system of words whih an
be translated into a formal physial theory. Beause number theory is based
on the natural numbers, phyisial theories are at least as large as Prinipia
Mathematia (Kitada, 1999).
Also if ToE is axiomatized, it will be at least as omplex as the system
of Prinipia Mathematia, so Goedel's theorem an be applied to it: If the
axiomatized system whih is equivalent to ToE is ontradition-free, then it is
not omplete, hene there will be statements within the system that are neither
provable nor unprovable. Thus it annot represent a theory of everything whih
is ontrary to our supposition.
8
In onnetion with this thought there is a
remarkable sentene in a paper of Balázs: In this ase physis would not be
an empiri siene at all but a part of the dedutive logi. Everything an
be dedued from unambiguous axioms whih were veried by the theory itself
and whih ould not be traed bak to other known natural laws. As Steven
Weinberg has written, if the Theory of Everything anyway ould be realizable
then it would have had to be logially isolated, i.e. it would not be modiable
beause it would ollapse then. (Balázs 2001) In any ase, by Goedels theorem
we ome to the remarkable onlusion that a possible ToE does not prelude
the anthropi priniples.
Our seond argument is the following. Let us suppose (even if impossible)
that someone will onstrut a world-formula and nothing is in onit with it,
i.e. every phenomenon ts in it. As Stephen Hawking rightly has noted, world-
formula is nothing but just masses of equations and laws. Anthropi priniples
are usable in the future too beause every number and formula is spei enough
for it to be obvious from one glimpse, in other words: a hypotheti nal answer
in physis, like a world-formula, only strengthens the ontingeny of the world
beause it leads to the question: why is the world as we nd it and not something
dierent.
7
There are several branhes of mathematis whih an be proven deidable and onsistent
by referene to itself.
8
In the ase of a ToE ompleteness and ontradition-freeness is a neessary ondition!
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4 Conlusion
As we have seen anthropi priniples emerged beause state that physial on-
stants and laws of the Universe must be ompatible with our life. Hene these
priniples ontain philosophial ontents (see Appendix 2.). But in speial ases
these ontents an be dierent for dierent sientists. We showed that Goedel's
inompleteness theroem may deny those eorts whih aim to show that an-
thropi priniples an be ruled out by some form of unied theories. Interpre-
tation of Goedel's theorem in physis have started just now (exept Tipler's
short reetion on Jaki's artile (Jaki, 1987), Tipler, 1990 p. 325) hene uses of
Goedel's theorem in physis are obvious today but its exat plae is not. Or in
other words: dierent approahes an be equally valid.
Appendix 1. Further anthropi denitions
In the main text we mentioned the denitions of WAP and SAP only. Here we detail
these denitions and also investigate further denitions. There exist several dierent
versions or supplements of SAP. The most known is the design argument (DA):
There exits one possible universe designed with the goal of generating
and sustaining observers. (Barrow-Tipler 1996, p. 22.)
This DA seems to be neither probable nor deniable in any physial or logial way,
and it has a strong religious ontent when the design is a work of a Designer. Hene
physiists do not use it willingly (however there exist some exeptions). Instead of
the DA, several variants have appeared. All of them try to answer question of the
onnetion between human existene and ne-tuned physial onstants detailed in
SAP to avoid in any way the design argument (DA).
The partiipatory anthropi priniple (PAP) appears as a result of the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum-mehanis:
Observers are neessary to bring the universe into being. (Barrow-Tipler
1996, p. 22.)
Now let us onsider a train of thought whih drives us to the third variant of
SAP alled many worlds-hypothesis (MWH). To state that the physial onstants of
the universe derive spei values from an ensemble of dierent values, we have to
suppose the (i) oneptual or (ii) real existene of the numerial ensemble.
The DA has hosen the rst solution (i), when the other possibilities exist only as
possibilities in the mind of the Designer.
The many-words-hypothesis represents the seond version (ii), the strit denition
of whih is the following:
An ensemble of other dierent universes is neessary for the existene of
our Universe. (Barrow-Tipler 1996, p. 22.)
If we think PAP to be true, then we will have the following question: what happens
when life (emerged aording to SAP) one dies out? Does the universe itself ease to
exist, beause of a lak of quantum-eet of observers? The nal anthropi priniple
(FAP) was born to solve this problem:
In the Universe intelligent information-proessing life must ome into ex-
istene, and one it omes into existene it will never die out. (Barrow-
Tipler 1996, p. 23.)
It is worth emphasizing that only the WAP seems to be well-founded among the
above denitions.
6
Appendix 2.Philosophial reetions on hidden philosoph-
ial ontents in anthropi priniples
As it was partly stated in Appendix 1., exept for WAP's methodologial harater,
these priniples have speulative and philosophial ontents. In onnetion with the
design argument (DA) we have mentioned that it does not seem to be provable or
deniable by mathematial or sienti methods, hene physiists usually do not aept
it. Now let us examine some philosophial ontents of anthropi priniples in detail.
9
SAP ontains a powerful but physially not provable statement. The use of the an-
thropi argument in SAP has ontologial meaning. In our point of view, physis is
not able to say anything about existene, only about quantitative aspets of existing
things.
DA has ontologial meaning too, insofar as it refers to a Designer. It is usually refuted
beause of its philosophial ontent. In opinions about SAP this problem does not
rise.
PAP is based on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum-mehanis. This inter-
pretation is aepted by the majority of physiists but only in methodologial sense,
a minority onsiders it in ontologial meaning. In its methodologial meaning the
Copenhagen interpretation states only that e.g. there is no separate partile or wave
whih an be measured, just wave-pokets. This treatment identies physial reality
with the mathematial model desribing it. However, it does not onsider this iden-
tity true in an ontologial meaning, but as a working hypothesis. The trouble starts
when this methodologial oneption is extended to the existene of things. It is true
e.g. that two quantities having a ertain onnetion between them are not measurable
with puntualityat the same time, but it is not valid to state that these quantities
do not exist puntually just beause they are not measurable puntually.
10
This
latter statement is the fallay of petitio prinipii.
11
(Jaki, 1998, pp. 117-147.)
Those who, aording to the PAP, argue that universe needs observers beause
observers ontrat the wave-funtions of it and with this brings it into existene, the
Copenhagen interpretation is used in its seond (and defetive) meaning. There is no
doubt that it is possible to onstrut a ontinuity equation from wave-funtion, and
the obtained |ψ|2 streams in time, and it is also true that |ψ|2 more and more ows
away in time, but it is wrong to onlude from this that an away-owing wave-poket
9
Being strit, these statements often are only non-physial. But we do not laim non-
physial and philosophial statements to be equivalent.
10
In quantum mehanis measurement means that the measured system has more eigen-
values and it jumps in one of them during the measurement. Systems exist in the linear
ombination of the all possible state and not in eigenstate before measuring. Mathematially:
ψ =
∑
n
i=1
|ci|
2ai, where ψ is the wave funtion of the system, ai is the value of the i-th
eigenstate, |ci|
2
is the probability of i-th state. All |ci|
2
are dierent and non-zero before
measurement, but only one of them will be non-zero and has the value of 1 after the mea-
surement.
∑
|ci|2 = 1 is always true, i.e. the system is omplete. Interesting to note that
the Copenhagen interpretation has a rival theory, the theory of hidden variables. Aording
to von Neumann's proof (von Neumann 1955 [1932℄) there are not dispersion-free states thus
a theory of hidden variables is impossible. Bell showed that von Neumann's proof is false
(Bell 2004 [1964℄). There is an interesting orollary in the theory of hidden variables. In
order to aept a theory of hidden variables one has to aept the violation of loality. Latest
experiments have onrmed that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum-mehanis is not
satisfatory (Home-Gribbin 1999).
11
There is a supposition in the bakground (only measurable things an exist) whih is not
a proven fat. The petitio prinipii fault is in the inadequate use of the world puntually.
When it refers to the measurement it has operational meaning and when it refers to the
existene it has ontologial meaning.
7
an be ontrated to a partile (or to Universe in this ase) for two reasons:
• The meaning of the square of wave-funtion is the probability-density of nding
the partile. It is not idential with the partile. The partile does not ow
away, but our knowledge about the loality of the partile beomes more and
more unertain in time. (The probability-density is a mathematial onstrution
and is not able to ontrat.)
12
• To ontrat the Universe's wave-funtion one must observe the Universe from an
external point, but it is per denitionem impossible in the ase of the Universe.
Conerning MWH some of the problems are aused by the very idea of the ensemble.
Hene questions whih emerge here are not purely ontologial but also logial and
methodologial. If there are many universes (with a small u), then they either interat
with eah other or not. If yes (they interat), then there is only one Universe, if not,
then it is meaningless to speak about them from a physial point of view beause they
are not observable.
13
However, their existene is not inonsistent with this hain of
ideas, beause it would be a logial fault as it was mentioned in the ritiism of PAP.
The many-words-hypothesis is valid for a physiist only if there an be interation
between the various universes of the MWH, even if, yet as of today this is not ob-
servable. Furthermore it is questionable whether there an be any meaningful use of
statistis where there is only one element (namely our own world) observable in that
hypothetial ensemble.
Finally the origin of the existene of this ensemble is also questionable. If physial
onstants and laws are dierent in every universe, then what laws reate the ensemble
itself? Can these laws be alled physial laws?
Conerning the FAP: it has a strong ontologial harater, and it annot be veried
physially or mathematially.
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